Executive Summary
In The Princess Bride, the lead kidnapper, Vizzini, dismisses missteps in his ill-fated scheme with a frustrated exclamation, "Inconceivable!" At length, his soft-spoken mercenary, Inigo Montoya, ventures: "You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it means." 1 An equivalent asymmetry in the world of economic analysis is the use of turnover on the Fortune 500 list. For years, many people have cited turnover-and ostensibly rising turnover-as a proxy for positive economic churn and rapid changes in the U.S. economy that are supposed to reflect underlying strengths in innovation and productivity.
We find that, while annual turnover on the list has, on average, increased since the early 1980s, it doesn't quite mean what many people think it means.
On average, annual turnover (the number of spots on the list that change as companies enter and exit the top 500) was moderate in the late 1950s, then lower and steadier through the 1960s and 1970s. Beginning in the early 1980s, annual turnover rose to historically high levels; by the second half of the 1990s, it touched new highs. After 2000, however, turnover returned to the moderate levels of the late 1950s. It's easy to paint a narrative around these numbers that coincides with the Great Moderation and the productivity revolution of the 1990s and early 2000s. But reality isn't so simple.
For one thing, turnover among big companies is not a new phenomenon. The late 1950s, as mentioned, experienced moderately high levels of turnover (at least compared to subsequent periods). Prior research has revealed considerable churn among big companies in the early decades of the twentieth century as well. Higher turnover in the 1980s did appear to reflect value creation as corporate conglomerates, ravaged by inflation and competition, were taken apart and remade into separate, more efficient companies. But, in the 1990s, higher turnover reflected (a) methodological changes in how the Fortune list was compiled, and (b) a mergers and acquisition boom, concentrated in a handful of sectors, that destroyed perhaps as much value as it created. Turnover is less a broad economic trend than a discrete temporal and sectoral phenomenon.
Still, we point out that the Fortune 500 list-and its changes over time-does provide a meaningful window into American capitalism, even if it doesn't mean what many think it means. It reflects a kaleidoscopic process of sectoral change and greater efficiencies at the level of individual firms, as well as some less sanguine economic developments. The latter includes the downside of higher volatility-the high M&A volume in the late 1990s included the largest number of the worst deals of the past thirty years-and the deleterious implications for consumers and households. Finally, it appears as if performance among the Fortune 500, as measured by return on equity, did not necessarily improve and, if anything, became more volatile over time.
Much amusement is derived from comparing Fortune 500 lists today to those of the 1950s and 1960s, when companies like American Can, Youngstown Sheet & Tube, and RCA bestrode the U.S. economy. Not surprisingly, changes in the composition of the list have followed broader economic changes. In particular, turnover and how it rises or falls over time is taken as indicative of these macroeconomic changes. Yet the turnover estimates vary among commentators, both in the basic numbers and in how much meaning to ascribe to them. Here, for example, is a sampling of claims regarding Fortune 500 turnover from a basic Google search:
 "In the 1980s it took just five years for one-third of the Fortune 500 to be replaced. And in the 1970s it took the entire decade to replace the Fortune 500. By contrast, in the 1950s and 1960s it took two decades." In each of these sources, Fortune 500 turnover is treated as a proxy for innovation, productivity, and, generally, that things are improving all around. These claims are repeatedly, and uncritically, cited elsewhere, but it is difficult to ascertain how some of these calculations were made, or even what some of them mean. They range from interesting and verifiable, to irrelevant and potentially meaningless.
With data provided by Ben Fry and the data analytics team at Fathom, 16 we set out to test such claims by calculating annual turnover-what have been some trends over time? More importantly, we also explore the meaningfulness of this turnovereconomists look at all sorts of figures for insight into the economy, with disputes over what indicators actually mean. 17 Taking into account its magnitude and the knowledge that such turnover is internal to the list itself, how much can and should we rely on Fortune list turnover as an economic indicator? None of this is meant to detract from the Fortune list itself-it is full of information about how the United States economic structure has evolved. 18 But it is probably difficult to sum up anything about the list in one number alone.
II. Descriptive Statistics of Fortune 500 Turnover, and Historical Perspective
We start with basic presentation of the number of companies annually turning over in Figure 1 . We exclude 1994 because Fortune altered its methodology in that year and, as a reflection of how the U.S. economic landscape was changing, began including service firms, not just industrials, energy, and manufacturing. As a result, roughly half of the list "disappeared" that year (more on this below 16 See http://fathom.info/fortune500/. The Fathom visualization allows you to sort the Fortune list by rank, revenue, and profit as well, which produces a fabulous picture of the within-list distribution of actual company performance. We made our own changes to the Fathom dataset because cosmetic tweaks to companies on the list, such as name changes, were sometimes wrongly counted in that visualization as instances of turnover. We have tried to be thorough in exercising editorial discretion over the data to catch such discrepancies. 17 18 Three years ago, we looked at the founding dates of current Fortune 500 companies, information which perhaps told a more interesting and useful tale of the American economy. See Dane Stangler, "The Economic Future Just Happened," Kauffman Foundation, June 2009, at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/the-economic-future-just-happened.pdf. Of course, founding date information also can be used erroneously-at a conference a few years ago, one attendee claimed that three-quarters of the current Fortune 500 list companies did not even exist (let alone make the list itself) before 1965, a claim which is just plain wrong.
between two consecutive annual lists-some companies drop off the list and then reappear several years later, so a simple tally of annual turnover includes these repeat appearances. As a prima facie matter, we can certainly see an apparent secular rise in annual turnover, with the early 1980s marking a decided inflection point, both in the level of turnover and its year-to-year volatility. This is followed, after 2002, in a slight fall. The overall trend for the 2000s, in fact, is downward, paralleling the 1960s and 1970s more than the 1980s and 1990s. 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 If we choose a starting year and an initial slate of companies in the Fortune 500 for that year, we can see at each successive year the number of original companies that still remain. Due to the constant change in the economy, this will necessarily decline. By choosing different starting years and plotting the curves of the decline from year to year, we can see how the pace of this turnover has quickened. For example, the list of Fortune 500 companies in 1955 (black curve) declines far more slowly than the list beginning in 1975 (red curve). This chart mirrors some of what we see in Figure 1 , but brings a bit more order to the numbers. We can see, for example, that a rising level of annual turnover does not hold for every single year. The largest deviations, perhaps not surprisingly, appear to cluster together.
It is tempting, when looking at the foregoing charts, to construct a narrative about the list and what it means. Glossing over annual variations, many commentators have compared turnover in terms of decades or periods. Popular literature and scholarship in economic history recall the 1950s and 1960s as an era of giant firms, the zenith of industrial capitalism, when John Kenneth Galbraith declared the entrepreneur to be finished in terms of playing any salient role in the economy. The 1980s and 1990s are set against these prior decades as an era of economic turmoil. To a certain extent, this is accurate and captured in the charts. 19 As we will see, however, idiosyncratic events, clustered in time and economic sector, may be what is really driving turnover.
To put this into any meaningful perspective, we first need to understand what it might mean. Is annual average turnover of thirty-one companies on the list of the 500 largest public companies, with occasional swings into the twenties and forties, a high rate of turnover? Low? To try to answer these questions, we looked at the work that several 19 But this also can be very misleading. We could just as easily compare, say, the three-year periods of 1956-8 and 1995-7 and claim that, because average annual turnover was the same (35), things haven't changed much in forty years. 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 scholars have completed on churn among large companies to devise some comparable numbers. This is a horribly inexact process, because of the vast differences between older and more recent datasets, the changing nature of equity markets, the difference in what constitutes the largest firms over time, what industries are and aren't included, and other issues. Nevertheless, we thought it important to at least try so that we did not examine Fortune numbers in a historical vacuum.
What these scholars have found, predictably, is that turnover among large companies is not a unique hallmark of our era. The "supposedly exceptional turbulence in corporate rankings," according to business historian Leslie Hannah, "is in fact also observed in the earlier periods of increasing national autarky and relative economic stagnation." 20 The reason is simple: "Corporate dinosaurs are ubiquitous in an ever-changing world." 21 Because no company, no matter how successful, lasts forever, and because only a fraction of companies survive more than a few decades, turnover of varying degrees is entirely natural. The ebb and flow in the level of turnover may simply be that, ebb and flow, with no transcendent economic meaning.
Hannah has looked at long-term trends in corporate change, finding that of the 100 largest companies in the world in 1912, twenty remained among the 100 largest in 1995. Of the original 100, fifty-four were headquartered in the United States, and of these companies, nine remained in the global top 100 in 1995. More than half of the American companies-twenty-nine-were no longer in existence, mostly due to acquisitions. 22 Such straightforward comparisons are misleading, of course. Prior periods of quiescence among large companies were, naturally, preceded by times of turnover. The "Great Merger Movement" from 1895 to 1904, in response to technological innovation and competition, led to a period of corporate stability, one that was in turn soon disrupted. 24 Bruner observes that 1,800 firms disappeared during that period, resulting in the formation of ninety-three trusts. 25 Consider, too, the turnover of the late 1920s, when new industries, on the back of electrification, came to be dominated by monopolies and oligopolies: 1,259 firms "disappeared" in mergers and acquisitions in 1928, with an additional 1,100 in 1929. 26 This includes both public and private companies, but represented a historically high level of activity-the number of M&A deals would not reach that level again for thirty years.
27
Underscoring the high churn, bear in mind that there were fewer companies overall at that time. The relative nature of turnover when there are more than 1,000 mergers and acquisitions-at a time when there were roughly 2 million corporations in the United States-might be comparable to twice that number in the 1980s, when the overall number of businesses also had doubled. 28 A more accurate comparison, of course, also would have to account for the value of the M&A deals as a share of gross domestic product. Some research finds that, while takeover activity above 2 percent or 3 percent of GDP is "unusual," during the height of the Great Merger Movement, it may have reached 10 percent-a level not achieved again until the 1990s.
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Summing up, business turnover is not necessarily a recent phenomenon and has previously reached (relatively) high levels. Each period of stability or turnover is the product of a prior period and carries the seeds of future trends. This dovetails with the argument of scholars such as Carlota Perez on the long-run cycles of economic change driven by technology and finance. 30 In some sense, turnover reflects the rhythms of capitalism. After all, from 1955 to 1959 (albeit only half a decade), average annual turnover was 6.5 percent of companies; in the 1960s and 1970s this fell to an average 24 of less than 5 percent per year. It rose to 7.5 percent annually in the 1980s and 1990s, but fell back to the 1950s average in the 2000s, at 6.5 percent.
III. Methodological Reasons Why Fortune 500 Turnover Might Not Be a Useful Indicator
The overuse of the survivor technique, distorting our understanding of the process that has led to the present state of things, has affected several disciplines besides business history. If we merely observe that many of the firms that now dominate the economy are of ancient lineage, or that some of today's top firms were also at the top a century earlier, we might conclude that giant firms are generally long-lasting; yet the stated observation is equally compatible with the hypothesis that some initially small firms grow rapidly to become large, while corporate giants have, over reasonably long periods, a poor survival rate. Our current knowledge of survivors dominates our impression of the typical experience, and their triumphs are lionized, while the history of the failures is forgotten or considered untypical. 31 We have seen that recent trends in Fortune 500 turnover have not necessarily been anomalous by historical standards. This doesn't vitiate the actual meaning of rising turnover, but it should dampen the breathlessness of some observers. We now turn to methodological concerns. In particular, the utility of comparing Fortune list turnover across time could be limited because of the long exclusion of non-industrial service firms. Beginning in 1956, the magazine published a separate Service 500 "directory of the largest U.S. non-industrial corporations." 32 This included industries such as commercial banking, diversified financial services, health care, life insurance, retail, transportation, and utilities. The service sector has, of course, been a major part of the American economy since well before Fortune began its list in 1955. But, as noted, Fortune only began an integrated services and industrials list in 1994. Some of the rising volatility in the 1990s likely reflects this higher level of sectoral diversity as well as more inherent volatility among service sectors. From 1955 to 1993, during the "industrials-only" era, median turnover on the Fortune list was twenty-nine companies per year; from 1995 to 2011, after services were included, the median rose to thirty-nine per year. Research has shown that shifting sectoral composition has accounted for some of the rise in volatility among publicly traded companies over the past thirty years. Specifically, as measured by employment growth volatility, there has been a fall in the employment share of manufacturing and a rise in the employment shares of Services, FIRE, and Retail: "volatility among publicly-traded firms in FIRE and Services is considerably greater." 33 This can be seen in Table 2 , which charts the sectoral share of turnover in the four years following the methodological change in the composition of the list. Thus, in 1996, 45.7 percent of the companies dropping off the list were industrials, which also accounted for 40 percent of new entrants. Service companies-reflecting everything from banks, airlines, and retail, to utilities, health care, and insurance-account for a larger share of exits and entries than industrial sectors. The one exception here is 1998, when services and industrials were even. Over time, as services come to account for a larger and larger share of the entire list, they naturally account for more turnover as well. Arguably, then, the stock that many commentators put in Fortune 500 turnover is well overdone because, while they point to it as indicative of underlying economic ferment, it long reflected only certain dimensions of the American economy. It only reflected, moreover, industries in which it takes a great deal of time to build large companies and, thus, displace incumbents. This also is apparent from a comparative historical perspective because the United States already led Europe in manufacturing productivity by the end of the nineteenth century-it was the catch-up in service sector productivity that may have truly consummated the American century, just at the moment when Fortune initiated its non-services industrial list. 34 Other researchers have shown that even during the supposedly staid 1950s and 1960s, there was plenty of innovation and churn in the U.S. services sector, especially in the growth-and globalization-of consultancies, advertising agencies, hotels, and fast food chains. 35 (Of course, even if service sector companies do not necessarily experience higher turnover, simply casting a wider sectoral net should expectedly lead to higher apparent turnover because of broader economic representation-it increases the probability.) 34 "Comparisons of nineteenth-century service industries like shipping and banking with their modern equivalents (airlines and financial services generally) suggest that (unlike in manufacturing) America was internationally uncompetitive in many service sectors in the later nineteenth century, but became the world productivity leader after World War II. … Thus, what happened in the twentieth-century American miracle was essentially that America got its act together in the non-manufacturing sector to consolidate a lead it already held (perhaps for essentially non-replicable reasons) in manufacturing (and agricultural) productivity. We also have concerns about the manner in which turnover is counted. Many companies enter and exit the list multiple times, with each one counting as an instance of "turnover." This says more about relative revenue performance among companies than larger economic trends. The table below shows how many times companies have entered and exited the list over the last fifty years. So, 1,332 companies have come and gone once, while 248 companies have come and gone twice, and so on. Remarkably, one company has entered and exited the list on fourteen occasions! 36
Sectoral Share of Companies Entering and Exiting List

Companies Coming and Going on the Fortune 500
Likewise, we recognize that many of the "new" companies on the Fortune 500 moved up from rankings below number 500. For example, ten companies that can be counted as "new" top 500 companies on the 2011 list were ranked somewhere between 501 and 525 the previous year. One natural consequence of this is that turnover on the Fortune 500 tends to be concentrated in the bottom of the list. 37 Our supposition is that, were turnover on the Fortune 1000 to be tracked, it would likely be lower than for the top half; but, since those data are only available since 2006, the comparison would not be nearly as robust. Nevertheless, movement in rank position is far greater for the lower-ranked Fortune 500 companies than those near the top.
Moreover, we need to keep in mind the ways in which the Fortune list gets formed. Commentators mostly take it to represent the rise and fall of companies and industries, and to some extent it does reflect that turnover. But it also reflects company-specific management decisions. Take, for example, the financial services company, MasterCard-it traces its founding to 1966 and has been a force in finance for decades, yet it only became a public company in 2006, duly turning up on the Fortune 500. Its rival, Visa, presents a similar example, going public in 2008 and immediately joining the ranks of the largest public companies. The appearance of these two companies on the Fortune 500 thus looks, by a simple count, as turnover, but cannot necessarily be used to infer anything about turnover at that point in time. It may 36 We have other concerns as well that deserve fuller investigation: in some instances, a company's appearance on the Fortune list does not match a cross-check with company history. 37 The longer a company has been around and larger it is, the harder it is to dislodge it from the ranking. Among cities this is known as Gibrat's Law, where the growth of a city is proportional to its current size, and for career longevity, this is known as the Matthew Effect, where the more esteemed an individual is, the easier it is for her to accrue future success. While companies are distinct from these systems (and in some ways mirror biological species), there is far more churn in the lower-ranked Fortune 500 companies than those near to the top. This implies a regularity to how the ranking of a company is correlated with its mobility. See Michael Batty, "Rank Clocks," Nature 444 (30) reflect management strategy, perceived conditions for an initial public offering (IPO), or something else, and the composition of the Fortune list is full of such variety. It doesn't mean we can take annual turnover on the list at face value.
IV. The Economic Meaning of Fortune 500 Turnover
We risk, however, swinging too far in the opposite direction. The observations collected at the beginning of this paper may place too much emphasis on Fortune 500 turnover, but it would be folly to argue that the list doesn't tell us anything. The ups and downs and trends in Figure 1 reflect, after all, underlying changes in technology, capital markets, and the divergent fortunes of different sectors of the economy. We may ask too much of the list by imposing a convenient narrative upon it, but the list does convey something meaningful.
Over time, as noted, mergers and acquisitions have generated considerable turnover among any chosen set of large companies, whether public or private. While M&A activity is not precisely coincident with Fortune turnover, we know that mergers and acquisitions do account for movement on and off the list, as well as up the list, with the increased size that results. Mergers and acquisitions also tend to occur in waveseconomic historians count five merger waves in the past century: Additionally, the period 2002 to 2007 saw another historic rise in M&A activity. 38 When we look at these waves in the aggregate, as with Fortune 500 turnover, we seemingly discern macro-patterns and connections across time. To be sure, each period shares certain attributes. But they differ in their particulars, and this variation-by year, by sector, by motivating force-is something we must bear in mind when seeking to generalize about Fortune turnover. The 1960s peak in M&A activity is known as the conglomerate wave, which resulted in sprawling enterprises that brought sundry disconnected businesses under one corporate umbrella. 39 Some of these conglomerates were taken apart in the 1980s wave, which contributed to the leap in Fortune 500 turnover during that decade. A gap opened between share 38 "These waves roughly synchronize with equity market conditions and thus carry with them the cachet of excess, hype, and passion that swirl in the booms. … Every M&A boom has a bust. prices and corporate book values, making it more lucrative to take the companies apart. Meanwhile, changing antitrust policy, deregulation across a variety of industries, and technological advance helped drive "a record number of divestitures, hostile takeovers, and transactions such as leveraged buyouts (LBOs)." 40 Indeed, Sobel claims that during the 1980s, "more than a third of the Fortune 500 corporations were acquired, merged, restructured, or taken private." 41 Overall, it was estimated that more than 1,500 public companies were taken private in the 1980s-nearly the number of companies listed on the entire New York Stock Exchange in 1988. 42 This was the age of junk bonds, when academics anticipated the "eclipse of the public corporation." 43 Even these levels, however, were surpassed in the 1990s and 2000s: there were four times as many M&A deals in the 1990s as during the 1980s, spurred in part by rising M&A activity in Europe and Asia. 44 In the 1990s, this wave was fueled to a great extent by information technology-at the height of the bubble, in 2000, there was far and away more merger activity in computer software, supplies, and services than in any other sector, with only manufacturing anywhere close. 45 The M&A wave of the 2000s had more in common with the 1980s, with private equity transactions as a percentage of total U.S. stock market value reaching peaks in 1988 and 2006, when public-to-private transactions also increased. 46 Table 4 . Totals do not always add to 100 percent because there remain some exits for which reasons are indeterminate. Table 4 shows a small sample of years for which we estimated M&A volume as a percentage of overall turnover. The share not only varies widely (even in this small sample) but also tracks overall trends in M&A activity. 48 The reason that M&A activity matters so much for interpreting Fortune 500 turnover is that it not only moves in waves but also tends to be concentrated. During the Great Merger Movement, the 1920s, the 1980s, and the 1990s, mergers and acquisitions clustered within certain parts of the economy. For example, the top merger industries in the 1980s were completely different from those in the 1990s. 49 This means that M&A waves and the sectoral concentration within them result more from industry shocksnew technologies, deregulation, financial innovations-than broad macroeconomic changes. 50 The same likely applies to Fortune turnover: what is interpreted as an indication of broad structural change is really a reflection of sector-specific developments. 51 The two are related, of course. Structural economic changes result precisely from these micro changes, but we cannot seize on one number as their embodiment.
In addition to mergers and acquisitions, changes in Fortune 500 turnover, particularly higher annual volatility, could be related to the burst of new public offerings in the 1980s. 53 The rising number of IPOs, in fact, could be a plausible driver of higher turnover among public companies-if there are more competitors, more targets for acquisitions, and the rise of newer industries represented by IPOs, then we would certainly see this reflected in Fortune turnover, particularly with a lag, after those newly public companies grew bigger. The causal link between these is probably quite attenuated. The relationship between IPOs and Fortune 500 turnover also will be complicated by the types of companies that go public as well as their age at the time of public offering. As shown in Table 5 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Other research has found that younger companies (defined as younger than ten or twenty years old) have been accounting for a greater share of total equity market capitalization. 56 While there is likely some link between IPO trends and turnover trends (particularly if we were to look down the Fortune 1000), it is not as simple as comparing volume. Further, rapid growth of newly listed technology companies in the 1990s followed by greater entry by older companies (and, thus, presumably larger, such as MasterCard), may have accounted for part of the rise in Fortune turnover in the 2000s. (See Appendix.) Indeed, the phenomena of a changing IPO market and rising Fortune 500 turnover are related. As documented by several sources, over the past fourteen years there has been a falling share of small company IPOs and, in turn, a growing share of large company IPOs. During the 1990s, $50 million IPO transactions accounted for threequarters of all IPOs; since 1998, that has plunged and has been around one-third since 2000. 57 Meanwhile, there has been a growing rate of acquisitions rather than IPOs for small companies-for venture capital-backed companies, the split between the two exits has reversed. In the early to mid-1990s, one-third of VC-backed exits were M&A; beginning in 2001, that has consistently accounted for 80 percent of such exits. 58 For those small companies that do go public, there has been a sharply higher incidence in the rate at which such companies are acquired within their first three years after IPO. 59 Similarly, small companies that have recently gone public have been involved in a much higher level of their own acquisitions in the past decade. Gao, Ritter, and Zhu call this an "eat or be eaten world" where, because of structural changes to markets in terms of 55 59 See, Xiaohui Gao, Jay R. Ritter, and Zhongyan Zhn, "Where Have All the IPOs Gone?" Working Paper, November 2011, at http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/Where%20Have_Nov4_2011.pdf. payoffs and incentives, organic growth is less sought and less valued than acquisitive growth. 60 Thus, small, growing companies either pursue an exit through acquisition rather than IPO, get acquired soon after going public, or, after their IPO, aggressively seek to grow through mergers and acquisitions.
One result of this has been a sharp drop in the number of public companies in the United States because there has been more M&A activity without a consequent rise in IPOs. 61 Greater Fortune turnover is both cause (M&A activity) and result (a focus on acquisitive growth rather than organic growth), and leads to greater variance in company growth rates and thus movement up, down, on, or off the list.
Further, we might expect that greater volatility among the Fortune 500 is reflected in company performance. Higher turnover, for example-whatever the causes-could have resulted in stronger companies dominating the Fortune list. Conversely, higher turnover might be a consequence of higher variability in performance, with more unstable companies veering in and out of the list, driven in part by mergers and acquisitions. To investigate this, we looked at return on equity (ROE) over time. As can be seen, the mean and median ROE remain quite constant from 1957 to 2005, without movement in any particular direction. However, the variation in yearly ROE for the Fortune 500 companies has increased, beginning in the 1980s (see Appendix). 60 See, Xiaohui Gao, Jay R. Ritter, and Zhongyan Zhn, "Where Have All the IPOs Gone?" Working Paper, November 2011, at http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/Where%20Have_Nov4_2011.pdf. 61 See David Weild and Edward Kim, A Wake-Up Call for America, Grant Thornton, Capital Markets Series, November 2009. 
V. The Relationship Between Fortune 500 Turnover and Macroeconomic Trends
The most important and intellectually interesting point about rising turnover on the Fortune 500 list is that it occurred during the period, from the early 1980s to the mid2000s, that has come to be known as the Great Moderation. By many economic measures, volatility in the American economy fell dramatically after 1983. The composition of falling volatility and the reasons behind it have been the subject of numerous studies. Some economists subscribe to stories of improved monetary policy and financial innovation, while others seek to prove a "good luck" hypothesis. Others have shown that the downward trend in volatility-in real GDP growth, durable goods output, and other areas-after 1983 was perhaps the resumption of the long-term trend of the 1950s and 1960s rather than a new development. 62 Davis and Kahn persuasively show that improved inventory management techniques played a large role in driving volatility downward in the 1980s and 1990s. 63 The juxtaposition with headline numbers on Fortune 500 turnover is stark: at the very moment that the volatility of aggregate economic output fell and stabilized, volatility among the largest American public companies rose, both in the aggregate and in annual variance. These two trends could be two sides of the same coin. First, reduced macro volatility, especially cheaper debt via low and stable interest rates, could have been a platform for greater turnover among large companies. This would have been given further fuel by things such as deregulation in a number of American industries in the 1970s and 1980s. 64 Second, rising turnover among the largest public companies could have been the mechanism for moderated macro volatility because it would drive productivity and lead to the disappearance of unproductive companies. Improved inventory management, a key development in Davis and Kahn's story, would be an example of this. More efficient supply chains mean more micro but less macro volatility. Individual firms differ on a wide variety of dimensions-those firms that more quickly adopted new technologies allowing them to better anticipate sales and implement justin-time inventory management would simultaneously drive out competitors (thus increasing turnover through both competition and M&A) and help smooth macro volatility. Theoretically, at least, higher efficiencies at the firm level should bring macroeconomic benefits along with higher volatility.
More telling, and more useful for our purposes, have been the findings of economists that firm-level volatility has fallen nearly continuously in the United States for thirty years. Employment changes (positive or negative) across most firms in the economy became smoother, more moderate in the annual change. Yet there is a crucial distinction. There has been a steady downward trend in employment volatility among privately held companies but a marked increase, especially since the early 1990s, in the same measure among public companies. This "volatility convergence" in employment holds when the volatility of sales at public companies is measured over time. 65 Some economists have attributed this to "a pronounced shift in the economic selection process governing entry into the set of publicly traded firms, and this shift greatly affected volatility trends among publicly traded firms." 66 In particular, the influx of new initial public offerings in the 1980s and 1990s drove rising volatility among public companies, especially since so many of those newly public companies grew so rapidly. 67 It is estimated that, by 2000, firms that went public in the 1980s and 1990s accounted for 40 percent of employment in publicly traded companies. 68 Take, for example, the computer company Dell-founded in 1984, it went public in 1988 and grew rapidly enough to make the Fortune 500 in 1992, subsequently vaulting up the list in the latter half of the decade. Davis et al show that the 1990s cohort of companies that later went public made huge employment gains by 2004, accounting for the largest employment share among publicly traded in an astonishingly short amount of time. 69 Turnover among the Fortune 500, then, is one reflection of that rising volatility among public companies, even as macroeconomic volatility fell overall. 70 Yet rising turnover among the largest public companies has not necessarily reflected anything unitary in the direction of the American economy. 71 For one thing, the rising number of newly listed companies in the 1980s would not necessarily have had a direct impact on the Fortune list-no matter how compelling the narrative one wishes to tell-because of the composition of the list. At that point, service companies were still excluded and while not all of those newly public companies were service companies, some significant share of them certainly were. Rising Fortune 500 turnover in the 1980s was thus likely more a function of leveraged buyouts, deregulation, and new sources of competition. In the 1990s, turnover rose to greater levels in part because of that prior wave of newly public companies as well as other trends, including another wave of mergers and acquisitions and the inclusion of service sectors.
Behind all of this is the growth and diversification of financial services, which economists attribute for the higher listing rate of more volatile firms as well as, perhaps, greater risk-taking by individual firms. In this story, greater portfolio diversification-via mutual funds, easier securities trading, and greater market participation-allows readier access for younger (and riskier) companies looking to go public, induces listed firms to take greater risks because of the larger pool of available capital, and "weakens one motive for organizing production activity around large, internally diversified firms."
72 The "financialization" of the American economy since the late 1970s, therefore, would have underwritten higher levels of volatility among publicly traded companies and greater Fortune 500 turnover in numerous ways: new types of investors (especially the growth of pension funds and mutual funds), cheaper cost of capital, more IPOs from younger firms, and so on.
Perhaps the most interesting analysis and visualization of the Fortune 500 (and 1000) and what it tells us about economic change and the U.S. economy would be one that is likely nigh impossible. This would show the threads of all companies that have fed into the list over the past 150 years, the origins, the combinations, the break-ups, and so on. Some of the giants on the list began as small, unassuming operations; others came into existence as giants from the start, whether as spinoffs, mergers, or well-capitalized new businesses. Thousands, perhaps millions, of companies are somewhere in the background of the largest companies now dominating the economy. It is in the total variety of these corporate histories-from the romantic to the humdrum-where we find 71 Comin and Mulani do propose a somewhat unitary development, which is the negative relationship between embodied and disembodied innovations. In their scheme, a rise in embodied innovations (patentable innovations) by market-leading companies would lead to greater firm-level volatility without affecting aggregate economic volatility. Furthermore, there would be more market turnover due to rising investments in embodied innovations because such innovations would be rivalrous goods leading to winners (such as new entrants) and losers (such as incumbents the real story of American capitalism and how economic growth happens, not in any summary statistic about turnover according to relative changes in revenues and market capitalization.
73 Such a project would roll in parts of evolutionary economics, the metabolic theory of ecology, Zipf's law, the detailed reconstruction of corporate histories, business lifecycle analysis, and so forth.
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VI. Concluding Thoughts
Something like the Fortune 500 list lends itself to irresistible generalizations about the economy. This is just the nature of history-the temporal brackets we place around events and the lines we draw between cause and effect each year usually dissolve in an incessant tide of new causes and effects. The list is unquestionably an important marker of American capitalism and several aspects of it can be used to chart historical change. Basic counts of the number of companies entering and exiting the list each year do illustrate rising turnover over time. For several reasons, this cannot be taken at face value.
First, from a methodological standpoint, the exclusion of service companies for forty years, the repeat entry and exit of many companies, and the concentration of churn toward the bottom of the list, all mitigate the economic meaningfulness of turnover. Second, even taking turnover as methodologically meaningful, from a historical perspective the rise in average turnover-and rising volatility-echoes prior periods that predate the Fortune list. It cannot be treated, as it is by some, as historically unique. Finally, to the extent that turnover reflects underlying economic changes-mergers and acquisitions, initial public offerings, changes in financial markets-these need to be understood on their own terms, with temporal and sectoral concentration and various causes, not filtered through a single figure of turnover that glosses over the variation. It is economic variation, along a host of dimensions, that is most meaningful for economic evolution, not aggregate data.
We must conclude by picking up the stick from the other end, as it were, and pointing out that the Fortune 500 and 1000 lists also represent something quite remarkable. In an economy in which thousands of businesses of all ages perish each year, and where only a fraction of companies can expect to survive more than a few decades, let alone grow to a large size, the persistence and growth and success of the companies on these lists is something worth admiring. True, the lionization of In Search of Excellence and Built to Last proved to be overdone, but, conversely, celebration of entrepreneurs (whether in terms of young, growing businesses or the canonization of small business 73 A good way to think about the Fortune 500 and all the threads that feed into it and change over time is in the context of Ricardo J. Caballero, Specificity and the Macroeconomics of Restructuring (MIT, 2007). For our purposes, Caballero notes that the "evidence points to a massive and persistent process of ongoing restructuring which takes place mostly within (rather than across) narrowly defined sectors." Id at 3. See also Larry L. Deutsch (ed.), Industry Studies (M.E. Sharpe, 3 rd ed., 2002). 74 The usefulness of any further research also would be enhanced by the inclusion of turnover among the largest private corporations in the United States, which Forbes has ranked for the last twenty-five years: http://www.forbes.com/lists/2011/21/private-companies-11_land.html. by politicians) can obscure the essential role of Fortune companies. 75 Such a statement must strike one as odd because the daily life of most Americans is full of interactions with both types of companies-how could anyone overlook the presence of Walmart or Exxon or Apple?
Nevertheless, as Michael Mandel has pointed out, it is a "now-heretical idea that scale is an advantage for innovation." 76 Take a look at how the United States compares against other countries, and you will see that big is not necessarily bad and small is not always beautiful. Statistics from the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) indicate that the U.S. economy derives a huge amount of benefit from giant firms. 77 Meanwhile, the Italian economy-not exactly known for dynamism of late-is dominated by small companies. While no simple generalizations can capture international comparisons, it is equally clear, to Mandel's point, that we cannot generalize about the relative importance of large and small companies. 78 If anything, the presence of larger and older companies has been growing in the United States, at least by some measures. This growing weight could be driven by Fortune 500 turnover. For example, there are four times as many companies with more than 500 employees today than in 1958, while the overall population of firms has only doubled over that time period. Twenty-seven percent of the workforce is in firms with more than 10,000 employees, compared to 11 percent in 1958. 79 In 1958, according to U.S. Census data, 55.1 percent of the American workforce was in "small" business, which the Census Bureau defines as firms with fewer than 500 employees. By 2009, this had fallen slightly to 49.4 percent. 80 Correspondingly, the share of employment in young firms (five years and younger) has been falling, from one in five employees in 1982 to one out of eight in 2009. 81 Indeed, Davis et al conclude that shifts in the age distribution of employment, from younger to older firms, account for one-quarter of the decline in volatility among privately held firms since the late 1970s. 82 On the harder to measure indicator of innovation, there appears to be some evidence that large companies have been accounting for a growing share of "disruptive" innovations. By one count, their share has risen from 25 percent to 35 percent over the past twenty years, twice the share of large companies from 1876 to 1980. 83 It also is not entirely clear that we should want or celebrate higher turnover among the Fortune 500. Do we want our largest, and seemingly most stable, companies zooming up and down the rankings? We want them to continuously innovate and even reinvent themselves (as most of the top companies have done), but not bouncing up and down in value. 84 Here, mergers and acquisitions are particularly valuable in terms of economic restructuring. Yet not all turbulence is created equal-in his sample of 2,800 M&A transactions from 1985 to 2000, Robert Bruner found that the very best and, especially, the very worst, value-destroying deals of the entire period were concentrated in the "hot market" of 1998 to 2000. The high Fortune 500 turnover in these years was thus not necessarily a good thing in terms of shareholder value and economic benefits. 85 Volatility among companies, moreover, also has implications for employees. Economists have found that even as macro volatility fell during the Great Moderation, this was not necessarily felt at the household level. 86 Income and consumption volatility actually rose, reflecting a rise in earnings uncertainty for individuals and deteriorating economic security despite apparent macroeconomic stability. This is another potential consequence of Fortune 500 turnover, especially as they come to play a larger and larger economic role.
None of this denies the important role of new and young and growing companies, of course. Most of the Fortune 500 companies began as small firms. Part of the reason for rising turnover is undoubtedly related to the greater role that younger companies have played in the U.S. economy over the past three decades, challenging incumbent firms. And, of course, there is a symbiotic relationship between young firms and large, established corporations. Many startups find their first customers in big companies, and many of the ideas coming out of large firms would not otherwise find commercial potential without entrepreneurs. Turnover among America's largest public companieswhether rising or falling, whether relative or absolute-only underscores the resilience of giant corporations and their essential role in economic growth.
Finally, Fortune 500 turnover and the trends and developments related to it are one more example of how mind-bendingly and marvelously complex the world of capitalism can be, with not only constant churn in terms of entry and exit but also combinations, divestitures, cosmetic alterations (name changes), strategic shifts, break-ups, acquisitions, and so on. This reality goes far deeper than what we can glean from aggregate numbers, and in their work, economists do not always convey this complexity. Those in the midst of it-managers, executives, employees, consultantseither do not seek the big picture or are prone to breathless extrapolations of small samples into the latest trends. But, this messiness is where prosperity is made.
APPENDIX Founding Dates of Fortune Companies
We must remember that American capitalism did not come into existence in 1955-the initial Fortune 500 list reflected the preceding years of turnover and change, just as the list of 1912 was the outcome of two decades of churn. What passed for relative stability in the 1960s may have simply been another lull between waves of turnover. Still, just as the 1960s witnessed great progress in the service sector, it also was far from a dull decade in terms of future Fortune companies. Here we see that two decades during which turnover on the list was relatively quiescent, the 1960s and 1970s, simultaneously saw the provenance of a large number of future Fortune 500 companies. This comparison, in and of itself, tells us nothing-there is likely no causal link we should draw between these numbers. Jay Ritter and others have documented that the falloff in IPO activity since 2000 has been due more to lower returns to small company IPOs and a rise in strategic acquisitions rather than regulatory activity. 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
